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Abstract 
Do earthquakes trigger political transitions? Using a rich panel dataset of 160 countries 
observed over 1950 to 2007, we find that earthquake shocks, measured in terms of the effect 
of ground-motion amplitude on death toll, have two contradicting effects on political 
change. On the one hand, earthquakes drive transitions into democracy due to a direct effect, 
which we interpret to be the reaction of voters to earthquakes by which they hold the 
incumbent government responsible for many human lives lost. On the other hand, 
earthquakes can indirectly hasten transitions into a less democratic regime if they increase 
the income level through ‘creative destruction’, and thus, make it costlier to contest the 
incumbent government. Overall, our findings show that, while not leading to a full-fledged 
regime change, earthquake shocks open a new democratic window of opportunity, but this 
window is narrowed by improved economic conditions.  
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1. Introduction 
Do earthquakes trigger political transitions? History portrays numerous tragic earthquakes that not 
only reshaped geographical settings, but also realigned the political powers within countries. Many 
ancient cities, including Herculaneum and Pompeii in Italy, Sodom and Gomorrah in modern-day 
Jordan, Bura and Helice in Greece, Lima in Peru, Copiapo in Chili, among others, faced 
catastrophic destruction by earthquakes that in turn changed the political balances of the then 
period (Boscowitz and Pitman, 1890).1  
In the modern era, earthquakes have occurred frequently without changing the topographic 
structure (e.g., Peru in 1970, China in 1976, Mexico in 1985, Armenia in 1988, the United States 
in 1989, Iran in 1990, Japan in 1995, Turkey in 1999, Indonesia in 2004 and Haiti in 2010), but 
causing massive human as well as economic losses in a greater proportion than that of ancient 
times. On average, approximately 1.4 million earthquakes occur in a year around the world (USGS, 
2011). Between 1950 and 2009, the earth quaked catastrophically around 570 times, not only 
killing over two million people but also affecting over 300 million people in total2 (EM-DAT, 
2011). In the last two decades, earthquakes have caused an average of 27,000 human deaths a year 
(Guha-Sapir and Vos, 2010). Figure 1 illustrates an important increasing trend of earthquakes on 
human mortality and economic losses from 1950 to 2009.3 
1  Sometimes earthquakes also remap the earth as a benefactor to human civilisation. For instance, an earthquake that 
resulted in a long rampart in 1819 at the mouth of the Indus still serves as an embankment protecting its adjacent 
population from inundation of the sea (Boscowitz and Pitman 1890). 
2  The number of total affected people is the sum of the number of people injured, the number of people rendered 
homeless and the number of people accessing emergency response services. 
3  This trend can be affected by the unavailability of natural disasters data in earlier periods, and hence, needs to be 
taken with a caveat. Note, however, that most of the seismic observatory stations to measure earthquakes were 
installed prior to 1950, i.e., before our sample coverage. 
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Incumbent regimes may face severely negative outcomes as a result of collateral 
destruction caused by earthquakes. Drastic changes in economic conditions triggered by 
earthquakes, such as altered income levels, investment, and the distribution of resources in the 
rehabilitation and renovation process, may affect the fate of the governing authority. Such a 
possibility of political change has been strongly indicated by a meteoric rise in the number of 
studies exploring political transitions sparked by drastic changes in economic conditions (see 
Lipset, 1959; Muller, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; and Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005). 
In a similar vein, a burgeoning literature has explored the influence of climatic, 
topographic, and more generally, geographic, conditions on political transitions. For instance, 
Brückner and Ciccone (2011) found that lack of rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa, through causing 
an economic downturn, led to transitions towards democracy. Further, this effect is unidirectional, 
since economic booms due to high rainfall do not result in transitions from democracy to autocracy. 
The theoretical background of these findings is rooted in the work of Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001), who predict that, in times of turmoil, pro-democratic masses may revolt against the 
incumbent autocratic regimes (which are typically supported by the elite) if the opportunity cost 
of doing so is sufficiently low. Facilitated by the underlying imbalance in political and economic 
power and due to reduced incomes (at least in the short run), such turmoil may, consequently, lead 
to political change. 
This paper contributes to the above line of research by investigating the impacts of 
earthquakes on political transitions. The principal link between this study and the afore-mentioned 
papers is that the turmoil ignited by earthquakes may alter the income levels and trigger political 
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change. We differ from the extant work above in two respects. First, we focus on earthquakes, 
which are catastrophes that result in deaths and various types of destructions, with potential long-
lasting consequences through economic and political turmoil that might follow. In this way, we 
also contribute to the scarce literature on the political economy of earthquakes studying their 
consequences on different outcomes (see, notably, Kahn 2005, Anbarci et al. 2005, Brancati 2007, 
and Keefer et al. 2011). Second, we distinguish between the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects of 
earthquakes on political transitions. That is, we not only study the income (i.e., indirect) channel 
of earthquakes in line with other studies mentioned above, but also consider the direct effect of 
earthquakes. We interpret the direct effect as the affective shock experienced by citizens due to 
the catastrophe. This sort of reaction may originate from sudden and unanticipated nature of 
earthquakes, which, unlike other catastrophes, come without early warning. They may thus 
instigate enormous anxiety due to imminent death that has just bypassed, which may lead, in turn, 
to a voter behavior that punishes the incumbent regime under psychological trauma. This reaction 
also parallels a number of historical accounts and anecdotal evidence in which countries face 
drastic political transitions ensuing a disaster whereby such affective shock drives political 
changes on their own right. This paper offers an empirical test of this affective shock effect, 
ignoring of which is likely to underestimate the true impact of earthquakes on political transitions. 
Together the direct and indirect effects that we consider in this paper cover the two major groups 
of incumbent regime responsibilities in the aftermath of a disaster. That is, people’s affective 
behavior is a function of emergency response and relief activities, and income is a function of the 
rehabilitation and recovery efforts. 
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Using the ground-motion amplitude derived from the Richter magnitude scale as an 
instrumental variable for earthquake death toll, we empirically verify the affective shock effect. 
Specifically, we find that it leads to a democratic improvement along the Polity spectrum. Several 
falsification exercises indicate that our interpretation of the direct impact as the affective shock 
effect is plausible. Moreover, we document evidence for two situations in which such affective 
shock becomes instrumental for improvement in democratic conditions; when there are national 
elections in proximity, and when the extent of insured disaster risk in the country is low. We also 
find that earthquakes increase income through a creative destruction effect, which in turn 
deteriorates democracy. This finding is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) who argue 
that contesting the incumbent regime becomes costlier when income increases. Again we 
document two mechanisms through which the creative destruction outcome can arise after 
earthquakes; investment stimulus due to post-disaster expenditure on reconstruction and 
rehabilitation, and transfer of technology to the affected country following disaster. The net finding 
in our analysis is that, while not leading to a full-fledged political transition, earthquakes improve 
the democratic conditions. Numerically, this effect corresponds to an improved democracy score 
of 1.2 points in the Polity scale of [–10, 10] for one thousand deaths in every one million. Our 
main result is robust to alternative approaches to econometric investigation.  
Before proceeding, we briefly illustrate the connection between earthquakes and political 
regimes graphically. Figure 2 portrays a significant association between earthquake death toll and 
democratic conditions. Higher death toll is mostly associated with ‘partially democratic’4 nations 
4  Partially democratic countries are those with a Polity2 score between 0 and 7, see Epstein et al. (2006). 
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with comparatively lower GDP per capita, while democratic countries with a higher GDP per 
capita seldom face deaths from earthquakes. This pattern suggests that earthquakes’ channels of 
impact and the way in which these channels alter political landscape are a fruitful question.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and some measurement issues related to 
earthquakes. Section 4 presents the estimation methodology. Section 5 discusses the results and 
presents several robustness checks. Section 6 identifies the mechanism of evidencing income and 
affective effects of earthquakes. Finally, section 7 concludes.  
2. Earthquakes, Income and Political Transitions 
Although several studies highlight the nexus between earthquakes and economic conditions 
(Ramcharan, 2007; Kellenberg and Mobarak, 2008; and Cavallo et al., 2010), only a few studies 
mention the link between earthquakes and political change (see Kubicek, 2002; Anbarci et al., 
2005; and Keefer et al., 2011). No study, to our knowledge, has hitherto pursued the relationship 
between earthquakes and political change in a systematic fashion. This section spells out the two 
potential avenues that could connect earthquakes and political change: i) affective shock of the 
citizens that may arise just after the disaster, and ii) changed economic conditions. 
2.1. The Emergency Response Channel: The Direct Effect of Earthquakes on Political Change 
This paper hypothesizes the first leading channel through which earthquakes may affect political 
regimes to be the human mind; people’s affective behaviour towards the incumbent regimes may 
be affected by earthquakes. Earthquakes, unlike many other catastrophes, come without early 
warnings. Consequently, their psychological impacts turn out to be enormous. Underlying the 
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psychological impact is necrophobia, that is, the fear of death, which is inherent in most adult 
individuals. Earthquakes represent a sudden and unexpected arrival of the probability of death. 
Although one may escape death in an earthquake incident, anxiety triggered by the incident might 
remain at extremely high levels given that people might have seen numerous others dying or in 
torment. Thus, sudden and unanticipated feature of earthquakes has direct and important 
implications for the citizenry, especially when individuals perceive the incumbent regime as 
responsible for deaths. Further, individuals hold the incumbent regime accountable not only for 
providing a short-run emergency response, but also for leading long-run recovery and 
reconstruction. If the government fails to address the emergency situation to the degree expected 
by the majority, people’s confidence on the current political regime may drop drastically. We argue 
that the direct impact of earthquakes provides an opportunity to test the voter reaction under the 
influence of major psychological trauma as directed towards the incumbent regime. This argument 
parallels a recent evidence which shows that voters may punish incumbent regimes for events 
beyond their control (e.g., Achen and Bartels, 2004; Coles et al., 2012) (see also below).  
The political change ensuing such shocks can occur either toward a more democratic or a 
more autocratic regime. For example, depending on where the regime initially lies in the autocracy-
democracy spectrum, a prolonged democratic process, a post-disaster conflict to share the basic 
resources, or a corrupt bureaucratic machinery observed in the emergency response phase may 
tempt citizens to elect an autocrat as a consequence. Alternatively, citizens might also expect the 
democratic regimes to ensure more equitable allocation of post-disaster relief, and their regime 
choice might be shaped by this expectation. In this regard, Cole et al. (2012) show using public 
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relief data from India that fewer voters punish the ruling party when the party responds vigorously 
to the emergency crisis, and that democratic regimes respond better to salient emergencies than to 
less conspicuous ones.  
History also supports these arguments. Drury and Olson (1998) document three anecdotes 
that portray the direct effect of earthquakes on political change. First, the autocratic regime of 
Guatemala failed to conduct emergency response and recovery activities after the catastrophic 
earthquake in 1976, and this initiated a process of democratisation leading to change in the 
leadership of the regime. Second, the twin earthquakes of Mexico in 1985 shook the one-party 
authoritarian regime, and the resulting legitimacy crisis triggered the emergence of a multi-party 
system. At the other extreme, natural disasters may lead to autocracies. The destructive Hurricane 
San Zenon, which struck the Dominican Republic in 1931, gave an opportunity to Rafael Trujillo 
to take advantage of the disaster by accelerating the emergency response as well as recovery and 
reconstruction activities. Later on, Trujillo capitalised on people’s sentiments and established an 
autocratic regime that ultimately became one of the worst and longest-lasting dictatorships in the 
Western Hemisphere (Crassweller, 1966).  
The political outcomes of earthquakes may also rest on the deep divisions in the populace. 
According to Cuny (1983, p. 54), “A disaster makes it very evident that the poor are vulnerable 
because they are poor, and this can lead to profound political and social changes within a society: 
many governments destabilize in the years immediately following a disaster.” Along these lines, 
Libaridian (1989) observed that the rescue and relief efforts for Armenian earthquake in 1988 were 
highly politicised, leading him to argue that this politicisation was one of the passive catalysts for 
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the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Similarly, the Marmara earthquake in Turkey in 1999 
fostered political turmoil (Kubicek, 2002), which, in turn, led to a new election in 2002, toppling 
the then coalition government.5 Recently, the Haiti earthquake in 2010 claimed over 222,500 
human lives while affecting a total of around 3,700,000 people (EM-DAT, 2011), marking several 
failures of the Haitian government in post-disaster response. Consequently, people elected the pop-
star Michel Martelly as the president.  
2.1. Income Channel: The Indirect Effect of Earthquakes on Political Transitions 
At least four considerations suggest the income channel as the second leading mechanism for 
earthquakes’ impact on political transitions. First, earthquakes may affect capital stock by 
destroying the physical infrastructure. Second, they restructure economic activities in many 
sectors, especially the secondary and tertiary sectors, eventually affecting employment 
opportunities. Third, earthquakes may attract external assistance and affect the fiscal capacity of 
the regime. Finally, all these may alter income levels by influencing the government policy, 
resource allocation, and power imbalance in the society. In what follows, we provide a brief 
overview of the income channel.  
I. Creative destruction vs. broken window hypothesis 
There is an extensive debate in the literature as to how natural disasters impact on the economy. 
One school of thought, relying on the celebrated Schumpeter’s (1942) ‘creative destruction’ 
5  A related effect of the Turkish earthquake in 1999 in regard to influencing public perception has been observed in 
a different sphere: the improved diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece, a neighbouring country that was 
rocked by another earthquake shortly after Turkey. International aid exchange between the two countries following 
these earthquakes is widely considered to be the turning point in decades-long strained public and diplomatic 
sentiments and animosities between the two nations. 
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hypothesis, argues that the rebuilding effect of natural disasters has a positive impact on long-run 
economic growth and development. Reviewing the literature from the 1960s, Tol and Leek (1999) 
reiterate that natural disasters facilitate upgrading of the capital stock via adoption of more 
productive technologies, which may, consequently, improve economic performance. Later on, 
Skidmore and Toya (2002), Cuaresma et al. (2008), and Loayza et al. (2012) have all presented 
various evidence in favour of the ‘creative destruction’ hypothesis. 
A different school of thought, namely, Bastiat’s popularly-named ‘broken window’ 
hypothesis, presents a contrasting view about the effect of natural disasters. Bastiat (1995) 
considers the potential costs and benefits of a broken pane of glass in a window, and argue that 
opportunity costs of funds spent to cover the losses due to destruction are unlikely to exceed the 
gains. Hallegatte and Dumas (2009) and Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) provide some empirical 
support for this hypothesis.  
II. Income and political change: Autocratic vs. democratic transitions 
As with disasters and income, the link between income and political transitions is inconclusive. 
Lipset (1959), Moore (1966) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997) show a positive connection 
between income and democracy, which is termed as ‘modernisation theory’. Epstein et al. (2006) 
observe that economic growth enhances the likelihood of democratic regimes. There is also 
evidence of feedback from political transitions to economic freedom and growth (see, in particular, 
Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005). However, challenging the modernisation theory, Muller (1995) and 
Przeworski et al. (2000) report that a rise in per capita income does not necessarily result in a 
democratic transition. Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) find that the positive association between 
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income and democracy is absent when one takes into account the country fixed effects. Brückner 
and Ciccone (2011) test Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001) theory of political transitions in the 
context of sub-Saharan Africa using rainfall as an instrumental variable, and find that transitory 
negative economic shocks open a window of opportunity for citizens to contest power, as the cost 
of fighting ruling autocratic regimes in that situation is relatively low. 
3. Data and Measurement 
We employ the Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) in our analysis (see, for instance, 
Skidmore and Toya, 2002; Kahn, 2005; Neumayer and Plümper, 2007; Ramcharan, 2007; 
Stromberg, 2007; Cuaresma et al., 2008; Cavallo et al,. 2010; Keefer et al., 2011; and Loayza et 
al., 2012). EM-DAT defines natural disaster as a ‘serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses 
that exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’. The 
database makes an entry if a disaster event satisfies any one of the following conditions: (i) 10 or 
more reported killed; (ii) 100 people reported affected; (iii) a call for international assistance; (iv) 
a declaration of a state of emergency. These low thresholds guarantee that most natural disasters, 
including earthquakes, are recorded (Ramcharan, 2007). Given these criteria, EM-DAT provides 
data on the disruptive effect of earthquakes, such as total death toll, injured, homeless, and affected 
people. Further, information on the physical dimension is provided with the Richter scale. 
When an earthquake strikes more than once in the same year, we take the annual sum of 
death toll and total affected at the country level. As noted by Keefer et al. (2011), this aggregation 
strategy is unlikely to affect our estimates. However, the same aggregation process is not 
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appropriate for the Richter measure, which is based on a logarithmic scale of base 10, where a 
small increase in the scale implies a large increase in its impact magnitude. To ensure 
comparability, we transform the Richter magnitude scale into ground-motion amplitude by 
applying the formula ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 10(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−3)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 , where A stands for ground-
motion amplitude from zero (i.e., epicentre) to peak (i.e., earth surface) and i for each earthquake 
incidence. See Richter (1935 and 1958).6 Moreover, following Keefer et al. (2011), we drop all 
earthquakes with a magnitude below 5. 
We adopt the Polity2 index to measure the quality of democracy. We utilize it in continuous 
form to gauge the extent of the change in democratic conditions since a regime transition can be 
inferred through the magnitude of change in the continuous metric, whereas an aggregate indicator 
which can be otherwise used would mask useful information. 
Appendix A1 provides the sources and definitions of other data, while Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of variables used. Appendix A2 lists the countries included in the sample. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Econometric Framework 
To track the direct and the indirect income effect between earthquakes and political transitions, we 
formulate a three-equation system in our econometric analysis. The principal advantage of the 
system estimation is that it explicitly allows for modelling the channels hypothesised in this paper. 
Specifically, using Three-Stages-Least Squares (3SLS), we estimate: 
6 Keefer et al. (2011) used the same formula (i.e., 10exp[magnitude–3]) with the exception that they subtracted 5 
instead of 3 from the Richter magnitude scale. However, Richter (1935) originally used 3 in the formula (see 
Richter, 1958). 
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(1)     𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + ∅𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2)     𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3)     𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  ∁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝜆𝜆2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝜆𝜆3𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where i stands for country and t for time, with country-specific fixed effects (𝛼𝛼,𝜕𝜕,𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∁), country-
specific time trend (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷,𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷), and common time-varying shocks that affect all countries (∅,𝜃𝜃 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛿𝛿); all are controlled in three equations of the system. In Equation (1), we explain 
number of earthquake mortality normalised by population (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ) by log ground motion 
amplitude of the earthquake (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) along with the quadratic forms of log income per capita (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 & 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦2). Log of ground motion is completely exogenous in this setting. We control for 
log income per capita and its quadratic in order to capture the differential effects of earthquakes in 
developing and developed countries. The impacts of natural disasters largely depend on 
preparedness levels and risk-mitigation plans within countries, and the quadratic income 
specification is expected to capture this differential (see Kellenberg and Mobarak, 2008; and Noy, 
2009). 
To measure the effect of earthquakes on income, Equation (2) utilises 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ as the 
explanatory variable, together with the log average income of neighbouring countries ( 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) as 
the exogenous shifter for system identification. A voluminous literature suggests that countries 
with open, large and developed neighbours grow faster than those with closed, smaller and less 
developed neighbours (see Ramon and Trehan, 1997;  Ades and Chua, 1997; and Kenny, 1999). 
We provide detailed explanations for exogeneity conditions of this shifter below. It is important to 
note that there can be Keynesian multiplier-type mechanisms that raise the expenditure and income 
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levels following an earthquake. Our specification captures the final outcome of this type of 
mechanism. Meanwhile, we explored the lagged effects of earthquake shocks on income up to 
three lags, and all the lagged terms are estimated to be insignificant. 
Equation (3) estimates the effect of 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 on democracy (𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦2). 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ 
represents the direct, i.e., the ‘shock’, effect of earthquakes on political change, specifically, the 
citizens’ reaction to the incumbent regime following the disaster. This interpretation is predicated 
on the notion that a shocked state of the human mind that may emerge after the catastrophe and 
that may result from either the government’s failure to address the preparedness phase prior to the 
disaster or its poor intervention strategies in the emergency response stage following the 
earthquake, or both, can drive a drastic political change. The historical anecdotes illustrated above 
regarding successful/failed governments in both preparedness and emergency response phases fits 
to this reasoning. Our interpretation of this effect as the ‘shock’ effect is also facilitated by the 
related instrumental variable: the greater the ground-motion amplitude, the greater is the affective 
shock, and the greater reaction to the concomitant death toll. Several robustness checks and 
falsification tests presented below yield strong evidence that interpreting this direct effect as the 
shock effect is plausible. 
On the other hand, in equation (3) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 is the indirect effect (i.e., income channel) of 
earthquakes on political change. The weighted average Polity2 score of neighbouring countries (𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃) acts as the shifter. 7 The relevance of this variable for 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦2 is well established in the 
7  Our neighbors’ size measure is GDP. Alternative size measures such as surface area and population yield quite 
similar results. 
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literature of democratic domino theory8 (Starr, 1991; Leeson and Dean, 2009; Teorell, 2010; 
Zhukov and Stewart, 2011). See below for exogeneity conditions of this shifter. 
 Our specification jointly controls for the country-specific fixed effects, country-specific 
time trends and common time effects (see Brückner and Ciccone, 2011). Such a restrictive 
specification is unlikely to pick up spurious effects. In addition, with the use of fixed effects and 
country-specific time trends, our models capture not only the deviations ‘from within-country 
means’, but also deviations of ‘relationships outside their country-specific long-run path’. Recent 
history demonstrates what may be an extreme but a highly illustrious example of this sort of 
relationship: the recent Arab Spring represents such deviations from the long-run political 
trajectories of the Middle Eastern countries, as initiated by Tunisia, later followed by Egypt, Libya 
and Syria. Indeed a recent line of research also takes advantage of regional democratization 
movements in explaining a country’s own democratic performance (see Acemoglu et al. 2014). 
Our neighbours-oriented shifter variables capture exactly this kind of spurts. 
4.2. Potential Caveats against Identification 
I. Ground Motion Amplitude 
While it is intuitively plausible that ground motion amplitude as an instrumental variable 
for earthquake fatalities is exogenous, it must also satisfy the exclusion restriction. Our assumption 
is that ground motion intensity affects income and polity2 only through the number of human 
8   During the Cold War, ‘domino theory’ concerned the expansion of communism, whereas in recent times it refers 
to the spread of democracy. Persson and Tabellini (2009) ascertained that democratic capital (i.e., countries’ 
historical experience with democracy, and the incidence of democracy in their neighbouring nations) not only 
reduces exit rates from democracy but also raises exit rates from autocratic regimes. 
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casualties it provokes. One may argue that ground motion intensity could not only strike population 
but also destroy physical capital, which is likely to have an independent effect on income and 
polity2. We explore such possibility by estimating the impact of ground motion on the extent of 
gross capital formation, and we did not observe a statistically significant relationship (not 
reported).  
Another possibility is that the effect of earthquake fatalities on income tends to be 
influenced by the level of urbanization: the larger population density implied in urbanization is 
likely to increase the reported fatalities from earthquakes in the last decades (as shown in Figure 
1). We control for income and its quadratic term when we estimate the impact of ground motion 
amplitude on earthquake casualties assuming that the level of development may play role in 
determining earthquake casualties (see Section 4.1).  
One may argue that a catastrophic earthquake produces a large loss of lives disregarding 
government’s preventive efforts towards disaster risk mitigation and emergency responses. Under 
such scenario, the signal of regime incompetence to its citizens tends to be unclear. Rather, it is 
“excess” fatalities—the death toll beyond what can be expected from the physical intensity of 
earthquakes—that provide the strongest signal to the population. Unfortunately we do not have 
reliable cross-country data on the extent of regime’s efforts towards disaster risk reduction. We, 
however, take an alternative strategy to estimate our benchmark model by restricting our sample 
to countries that are less susceptible to experience major earthquakes, and find qualitatively similar 
results compared to the global sample. 
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II. Neighbour-weighted Instruments for Income and Polity 
Using neighbour-weighted characteristics as sources of exogenous variations is not rare in 
comparative economic growth (e.g., Ramon and Trehan, 1997;  Ades and Chua, 1997; and Kenny, 
1999) and political economy literature (for instance, see Starr, 1991; Leeson and Dean, 2009; 
Persson and Tabellini, 2009; Teorell, 2010; Zhukov and Stewart, 2011). These arguments are 
based on the fact that countries with open, large, developed and democratic neighbours grow and 
democratise faster than those with closed, smaller, less developed, and nondemocratic neighbours.  
Notwithstanding our very restrictive specification that controls for country-fixed effects 
and country-specific time trends, hence capturing only out-of-long-run-trajectory relationships, 
one may argue that income of neighbouring countries (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)  may influence 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦2 in 
Equation (3) through channels other than the country’s own income. These mechanisms typically 
concern time-variant channels. The main possibility in this case is trade and other bilateral 
relationships: a spurt in trade with bordering countries is associated with a similar spurt in the 
income and democracy of a country. We empirically test this possibility by including the share of 
trade with neighbours in equations (2) and (3), but this does not make any difference to the results 
(not reported). This is consistent with Teorell (2010) who provides evidences that democracy 
diffuses between neighbours; this diffusion effect does not seem to be influenced by factors such 
as neighbour’s economic outcomes, economic shocks, political mobilization, or country’s 
membership in regional organizations. In our context, we control for whether a country is a 
member of a trading bloc, including the European Union, Commonwealth of Independent States, 
North American Free Trade Agreement, Association of South East Asian Nations, and Gulf 
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Cooperation Council. We find that membership of such unions does not make a change to income 
and polity, nor suggest a channel of concern for identification (the result is available upon request).  
An additional check is in line with Acemoglu et al. (2008, pp. 825) who test, using a large 
panel of world countries analogous to ours, for the relationship between trade-weighted world 
democracy and democracy at home. For instance, whether the US decreases its quotas for 
Bangladeshi garment exports if Bangladesh improves its polity score epitomizes the basic idea of 
this test. We symmetrically check this possibility by including trade-weighted income and trade-
weighted polity in income and polity equations respectively, both in separate and joint models as 
additional shifters, in the presence of log of neighbours’ average GDP and neighbours’ average 
polity score, but we find qualitatively similar results (see Appendix A3). This indicates that trade-
related bilateral effects are unlikely to contaminate our findings. 
Using neighbouring countries’ conditions as sources of exogenous variations may raise 
doubts from a conceptual perspective: if the performances of neighbouring countries affect 
domestic country’s income and polity2, by the same reasons, the country should have reverse 
effects on its neighbours. This argument may seem a serious violation of our identification 
conditions. In our dataset, 143 of 160 countries have more than one neighbour. This suggests that 
on average, a country is less likely to affect its adjacent (multiple) neighbours to the same extent 
that the neighbouring countries collectively do to it.  
Despite all these caveats, we may still be unable to entirely rule out the possible 
endogeneities that may occur through other time-variant political, social and cultural factors 
associated with our neighbour-weighted instruments. However, it should further be iterated that 
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our restrictive empirical design and a wide array of robustness checks along with pining down 
possible mechanisms support the view that other channels through which neighbours may affect a 
country are likely to be minor in our context.  
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Main Findings 
Covering the entire 1950–2007 period, Model 2.1 in Table 2 indicates that earthquake shocks, 
measured in terms of ground-motion amplitude and death toll, have two opposite effects on the 
level of democracy. Our estimates show that, after controlling for country-specific heterogeneity, 
common time shocks and country-specific long-term associations in related variables, the 
occurrence of one thousand deaths in every one million members in the population as a result of 
earthquakes in a given year increases per capita GDP by 0.374 per cent in that year, which then 
decreases the Polity2 score by 0.59 point, that is, 0.374 × (–1.567), in the scale of [–10, 10]. Both 
effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. This positive relationship between death toll in 
earthquakes and per capita GDP is consistent with the creative destruction hypothesis. On the other 
hand, the inverse relationship between per capita GDP and Polity2 score (i.e., –1.567) indicates 
that earthquake-driven increases in income levels reduce the level of democracy. In terms of the 
direct effect of earthquakes, our estimates in Model 2.1 strikingly indicate that one thousand deaths 
in every one million people improve the Polity2 score in a country by around 1.78 points, an effect 
that is statistically significant at the 1% level. The net effect of earthquakes, therefore, is that the 
occurrence of one thousand earthquake-related deaths in every one million in a given year leads to 
an improvement of 1.19 points (i.e., 1.78 – 0.59) in the Polity2 score. Given the [–10, 10] range of 
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Polity2, a 1.19 point increase corresponds to an improvement of 5.95 percentage points, that is, 
(1.19/20)×100. 
Overall, our estimates show that earthquakes indirectly (i.e., through increasing income) 
deteriorate the democratic conditions. This result is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001) in that the post-disaster expenditure on reconstruction and rehabilitation activities increases 
economic incentives in the economy leading ultimately to an increase in the opportunity cost of 
contesting the incumbent regime. Conversely, the direct effect of earthquakes is a democratic 
improvement. Earthquake shocks are likely to cause the voters to release their wrath against the 
incumbent regime because of the failure to save many human lives. Besides, empathetic citizens 
are likely to provide more charitable giving to the distressed victims if the regime fails to act 
effectively during emergency response period. This additional charity burden may incentivise 
empathetic individuals to support victims to contest against incumbent the political power (for 
instance, see Eckel, Grossman and Milano (2007)). Taken together, these results suggest that 
earthquake shocks open a democratic window of opportunity, but this window is narrowed by 
improved economic conditions.  
In Table 2, Model 2.2, we use the total number of affected people instead of death toll in 
earthquakes. The estimates indicate that earthquake shocks have only an indirect effect on the level 
of democracy and, somewhat expectedly, a zero direct effect. In particular, the occurrence of one 
thousand people in every one million people affected by earthquake leads to a 0.003 point lower 
Polity2 score through the income channel. While statistically significant, this effect is numerically 
low. The statistical insignificance of the direct effect, on the other hand, indicates that, when people 
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survive in earthquakes, they are unlikely to punish the incumbent regime. Therefore, this finding 
suggests that it is the death toll that triggers the nature of being shocked rather than being affected, 
which is ultimately reflected to the incumbent regime. What is common between the effects of 
death toll and total affected people in earthquakes, though, is that both affect the Polity2 score 
negatively through raising income (i.e., the indirect effect).  
 In Table 3, Model 3.1 includes only the observations for developing countries and Model 
3.2 includes those for developed countries, both using death toll information. In Model 3.1, both 
direct and indirect effects of death toll in earthquakes qualitatively remain similar to that in Model 
2.1. Moreover, the direct shock effect of earthquakes on the Polity2 score becomes statistically 
more significant (i.e., at the 5% level). In particular, the occurrence of one thousand deaths in every 
one million people directly improves democracy by 2.33 points in the Polity2 scale of [–10, 10]. 
Similarly, the indirect effect (i.e., through the income channel) of death toll in developing countries 
on the Polity2 score is negative, which is 0.97 points. In sum, the net effect of earthquake death 
toll in developing countries is a movement into democracy (i.e., approximately 1.36 points in the 
Polity2 scale).  
However, in Model 3.2, the direct effect of earthquake death toll on the Polity2 score in 
developed countries is insignificant. This finding, unsurprisingly, suggests that governments in 
developed countries tend to be more effective at reducing earthquake risks compared to developing 
countries (e.g., in terms of formulation and implementation of appropriate building codes, 
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earthquake contingency plans, Standing Orders on Disaster (SoD) and disaster management acts).9 
Consequently, post-earthquake affective shocks and the scope for the incumbent regime being held 
responsible for failure are minimised. In terms of the indirect effect of death toll, developed 
countries again exhibit insignificant effects on income levels, and subsequently on political 
change. In summary, the results in Model 3.2 intuitively indicate that developed countries exhibit 
neither a direct nor an indirect effect of earthquakes on political change. It is noteworthy that the 
shifter variables in all regressions in Table 3 are strongly significant, rendering the system 
estimates reliable. 
 Model 3.3 tests the finding of Przeworski et al. (2000) that countries with per capita GDP 
over US$4,000 are more likely to stay in a democratic regime even after confronting any 
exogenous shocks. We find that the income effect of earthquakes on the Polity2 score is 
insignificant in this set of countries. That is, earthquakes neither increase per capita GDP nor 
facilitate autocratic change. In addition, the direct shock effect of earthquakes in countries with 
per capita GDP over US$4,000 fosters democratic improvements (i.e., around 2.76 points in the 
Polity2 score), and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Taken together, our result 
is consistent with the findings of Przeworski et al. (2000).10 
 
 
9 For instance, according to Keen and Pakko (2011), in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina the Federal 
Reserve Bank of USA has increased nominal interest rate that mitigated temporary inflation effects and output 
distortions. 
10 We replicate Table 3 by substituting ‘total affected people’ for ‘death toll’ in earthquakes while maintaining the 
specifications exactly the same, and found qualitatively similar results. The results are available upon request. 
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5.2. Robustness Checks 
Our first robustness check is with respect to the categorization of democracy. Epstein et al. (2006) 
employ trichotomous categorization of regimes and find strong support for the modernization 
hypothesis, while Przeworski et al. (2000) find no evidence for it using a dichotomous 
classification. This finding suggests that our results related to earthquake-driven income changes 
may differ with respect to discrete categorizations of democracy. Further, if our interpretation that 
the direct effect captures voters’ affective reaction to earthquakes is correct, then autocratic 
countries should be less likely to exhibit this reaction, due to the oppressive nature of those 
regimes. Bearing out this falsification test, Table 4, Model 4.1 reports that, after controlling for 
country-specific heterogeneity, common time shocks and country-specific long-term associations 
in the related variables, the direct effect is estimated to be insignificant in autocratic countries (i.e., 
countries with a Polity2 score between –10 and 0). However, the implication changes astonishingly 
when only partially democratic countries (with Polity2 scores between 1 and 7) are considered. 
There is a dramatic shock effect in the order of an increased Polity2 score of 4.6 as a result of one 
thousand deaths in every one million people. This finding strongly suggests that, in partially 
democratic countries, outrage expressed by citizens may lead to political change, and the net 
outcome is a significant improvement in democracy.11 In Model 4.3, using fully democratic 
countries (i.e., with Polity2 scores between 8 and 10 points), no evidence is found for a direct or 
indirect effect of earthquakes on political change. The lack of a significant direct effect here is 
11 To check if earthquakes have any bifurcation effect on different political regimes, we ran the same specification 
as in Model 4.1, by dividing the observations based on the median of the Polity2 score (which is –1), and found 
no evidence as such (not reported). 
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noteworthy, suggesting that, with all the necessary measures having been taken, people in fully 
democratic countries are, overall, not prone to punish the incumbent regime following 
earthquakes.12  
The second robustness check is related to sample composition. Since earthquake hazard is 
not distributed evenly all over the world, it may seem that our results can be driven by a few 
countries with frequent earthquakes. Following Toya et al. (2010), we conduct robustness checks 
concerning the ‘Ring of Fire’ countries (i.e., Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines and the United States). The results, reported in Table 5, 
are comforting. In particular, Model 5.1, excluding the Ring of Fire countries, finds that the 
occurrence of one thousand deaths in every one million people increases per capita GDP by 0.42 
per cent, which leads to a decrease in the Polity2 score by 3.85 per cent, that is, (0.769/20)×100. 
The direct effect is also significant and drives a democratic improvement. On the other hand, we 
estimate the same specification as in Model 5.1 but only for the observations of ‘Ring of Fire’ 
countries.13 This sensitivity analysis can also be considered as another falsification test regarding 
the direct effect of earthquakes in that, within the ‘Ring of Fire’ countries, and considering our 
long time span of analysis, voters may become accustomed to living with earthquakes and may 
12  However, earthquake shocks decrease the per capita GDP significantly. This is probably because most of the fully 
democratic countries are already developed, and hence exhibit more exposure to financial damage due to 
earthquakes. Perhaps not surprisingly, this negative income shock due to earthquakes does not translate into 
political change, possibly because the opportunity cost of contesting the incumbent government is very high. 
13  The estimation results are available upon request. 
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exhibit no affective reaction to losses. The results indicate that the direct shock effect of death toll 
in earthquakes in earthquake-prone countries is, expectedly, absent. 14 
The third robustness analysis checks whether our results are held in terms of different 
earthquake intensities. Model 5.2 of Table 5 excludes major earthquakes that are in the Richter 
magnitude scale of 8 and above. It shows that the occurrence of one thousand deaths in every one 
million people increases per capita GDP by 0.38 per cent, which leads to a decline in the Polity 
score by 1.65 points. This result is qualitatively similar to what we found in Model 2.1, that is, the 
net effect of earthquakes corresponds to an improvement in democracy.15  
Final robustness check of the presence of direct effect of earthquakes is related to the 
intensity of earthquakes in terms of their magnitudes. An earthquake with 7 in Richter magnitude 
scale is equivalent to 10 earthquakes with Richter magnitude 6 in terms of our measure of total 
ground motion. However, one earthquake with 7 in comparison to ten earthquakes with magnitude 
6 should generate varying reactions among the citizens. To check whether repetitive catastrophes 
fail to surprise citizens such that the latter become insensitive to such events, Model 5.3 of Table 
5 augments our baseline Equations (1) and (3) by including the number of earthquakes occurred 
14  A valid concern regarding the Death variable in equation (3) is that it might capture international disaster relief 
and aid efforts, whereby a greater amount of aid relief, attracted by a higher death toll, might spuriously affect 
citizens’ perception of the incumbent regime in a positive direction. To rule out such a possibility blurring our 
interpretation of the direct effect, we control for disaster aid in equation (3). Although quality of the data on 
international aid (obtained from EM-DAT 2011) is a concern due to possible misreportings, our basic results 
remain intact after this exercise (unreported).  
15 However, unlike Model 2.2, once we exclude major earthquakes from the benchmark sample, the direct effect of 
total affected people in earthquakes on the Polity2 score becomes significant (not reported). Perhaps people are 
tolerant to the incumbent regime in the case of massive earthquakes, assuming that these are the ‘acts of God’ (i.e., 
events that are beyond the control of humans). On the other hand, if earthquakes are at medium intensity (i.e., less 
than magnitude 8), affected people react to the regime, assuming that the incumbent government could have 
minimised the casualties and economic losses. 
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with a Richter scale of 5 and above in a given year for each country. In this way, we take out the 
effect of frequencies of earthquakes from the log of total ground motion from Equation (1) of 
Model 6.3. Likewise, Equation (3) checks our interpretation of the absence of a shock effect on 
democratic conditions if earthquakes strike frequently. The insignificant direct effect on when the 
frequency of the earthquakes is controlled suggests that frequent earthquakes fail to surprise 
citizens, in which case the current political regime remains more stable. The frequency of 
earthquakes itself has a positive and significant sign, indicating a democratic improvement.   
6. Possible Mechanisms 
We now turn to mechanisms through which the direct (i.e., affective) and indirect (i.e., income) 
effects of earthquakes on political change may arise. 
6.1. Mechanisms for the Income Effect of Earthquakes 
Our empirical findings suggest a positive relationship between earthquake fatalities and income, 
supporting the creative destruction hypothesis. We investigate how earthquakes may improve the 
income level and provide suggestive evidence in favour of our findings using two channels, 
including technology transfer and investment stimulation mechanisms.   
 Technology transfer. Consistent with the ‘Build Back Better’ principle, earthquakes may 
facilitate the installation of more productive technologies following the destruction of domestic 
capital stock (see Kennedy et al 2008). One mechanism for such creative destruction is 
documented in a well-cited study by Cuaresma et al (2008), who show that developing economies 
receive high technology from technology-abundant countries ensuing natural disasters. Recent 
examples of such transfers include the introduction of low-cost emergency shelters by the US-
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based Shelter2Home in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake (Lainé, 2010), and the transfer of solar 
lamps working with LED technology by German Solar Energy Foundation to affected regions 
following Typhoon Haiyan- 2013 in the Philippines. Thus, based on the assumption that 
technology transfer occurs from high-tech to low-tech countries following disasters, we check the 
creative destruction effect through a sample split. Differentiating the level of technology across 
countries by the number of patents obtained,16 column 5 of Model 6.2 shows that—in low-tech 
countries, where the number of patents is lower than the sample median—one thousand deaths in 
every one million people as a result of earthquakes increase per capita GDP by 0.367 per cent in 
a given year. This positive impact is consistent with the afore-mentioned technology transfer 
phenomenon.  By contrast, column 8 of Model 6.3 indicates that, for high-tech countries, one 
thousand deaths in every one million decrease per capita GDP by 1.065 per cent. This result is 
plausible, as countries with high levels of technology are highly unlikely to ‘build back better’ 
through technology transfer. What is observed is the destruction of capital stock which is replaced 
by the country’s own means (as in the case of Hurricane Katrina in the US). Appendix A5 checks 
these results with 2SLS and finds qualitatively similar findings 
 Investment stimulus. Earthquakes may trigger a multitude of financial activities by boosting 
investment on post-disaster recovery and reconstruction, which would in turn foster employment 
opportunities followed by increased income levels. This stimulus is likely to be observed in 
economies with high-investment regime where new investment can be generated relatively easily 
16  The dataset on the number of patent applications for each country is taken from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2012), where the median of total number of patent applications in our dataset is 1226. 
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using the accumulated capital stock. See Appendix B.1 for an illustrative case study of China on 
creative destruction through investment stimulus. Based on this conjecture, models 7.2 and 7.3 of 
Table 7 show the results for two sub-samples— countries with low investment regimes and high 
investment regimes, respectively.17 The results indicate that earthquake death toll does not affect 
income in countries with low investment regime. On the contrary, as depicted in Model 7.3 (in 
particular, column 8 of Table 7), earthquake death toll increases per capita GDP in countries with 
investment share in GDP above the median. We check this hypothesis with 2SLS and find similar 
findings (see Appendix A6). Thus, one can consider investment stimulus as a relevant mechanism 
through which earthquakes may lead to increased income levels.  
One may also posit that financial stimulus can be triggered by international aid, as 
earthquakes are likely to attract external assistances. We augment our baseline estimation model 
in Table 2 with disaster-specific international aid in the income equation. However, we find no 
evidence of earthquake-related international aid effect on income. See Appendix A7. 
6.2. Mechanisms for the Affective Effect of Earthquakes 
We interpret the direct effect of earthquakes as the affective shock experienced by citizens, which 
may also be fueled by the incumbent regime’s poor performance in emergency response. While it 
is empirically challenging to approximate the regime’s post-eartquake emergency response for a 
panel like ours, we provide evidence on the affective shock through election proximity and 
insurance premiums as mechanisms. 
17  The median investment share of GDP per capita in our sample is 19.61 percent and the average investment share 
in below-median countries is 11 percent. 
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 Election proximity. Cole et al. (2012) demonstrate that voters punish the incumbent party 
for weather events beyond its control.18 However, fewer voters punish the incumbent regime if it 
takes appropriate measures (e.g., distribution of relief goods and services) to address the 
emergency response and recovery phases effectively. Using this intuition, we augment our 
benchmark democracy equation with three additional variables where a binary indicator of the 
national elections in the past year19 is interacted with three most recent lags of earthquake death 
tolls. Model 8.2 in Table 8 demonstrates that the direct effect of earthquakes on democracy 
disappears once we control for these interactions. Importantly, the coefficient of the interaction 
term involving one year-lagged death toll and elections is estimated to be positive and significant, 
while the interaction terms involving the prior lags of the earthquake death toll are insignificant. 
This finding indicates that when national elections and earthquakes both occur within a given year, 
the polity score is increased significantly by 5.3 points in the following year. This outcome can 
arise in two possible ways. The first possibility is the case where the earthquake occurs before the 
elections within the year such that citizens punish the regime in the elections for its failure to 
address post-earthquake emergency response. Presumably this punishment paves the way for the 
election of a more democratic regime. The second possibility is that the earthquake occurs after 
18  Recent evidence also shows that voters may punish governments for events beyond their control. For instance, 
Achen and Bartels (2004) find that leaders are punished for droughts, floods, and even for shark attacks. 
19  Using the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset, we construct the election year 
dummy variable if any election—including presidential, legislative, parliamentary, and constituent assembly— 
takes place in a given year (see Hyde and Marinov 2012). We utilize the elections indicator with both 
contemporanous value and one year-lagged value in alternate models. The significant effect is observed when 
elections are used with one-year lag, possibly because a lag exists between elections and change in the democratic 
conditions due to time needed to form a government after the elections, and/or to implement policies that lead to 
the change in political landscape. 
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the elections in that year, such that the newly elected government’s willingness to support the 
victims and to reduce the citizens’ affective shock is substantial. This finding nevertheless 
confirms that in both situations, earthquakes improve the democratic conditions through the 
election mechanism. 
 Insurance premiums. The affective shock experienced by citizens due to earthquakes may 
particularly be fueled by the incumbent regime’s poor performance in post-disaster response. 
However, this effect is likely to be weaker or even absent in countries where disaster-related 
damages are covered by insurance packages. We infer that the level of total insurance premium in 
a country would proxy the extent of insured risks; the higher the total premium, the broader the 
coverage of insured disaster risks, thus the lower the possibility of a regime-changing affective 
shock.20 With this hypothesis at disposal, we run our benchmark model (i.e. Model 2.1) by splitting 
the dataset into two sub-samples— countries below the median of average per capita total 
insurance premium and countries above the median of the same.21 Table 9 demonstrates that the 
affective shock effect of earthquakes on democracy is absent in countries with higher per capita 
20 Insurance packages can be both life and non-life. One might ask whether insurance premiums can differ across two 
countries because of their differences in disaster risks. Another question is whether insurance premiums can reflect 
anomalies in the local insurance market. To answer the first concern, note that ours is a within-country analysis 
meaning an increase in insurance premiums within a locality is likely to be due to better coverage of disaster risks 
over time. Regarding the second concern, that insurance premiums reflect a market anomaly (perhaps, a supply-
demand disequilibrium) is a possibility, but note that in most countries the insurance market is competitive and 
comprise multinationals that have relatively standard pricing policies across countries. In addition, any supply-
demand disequilibrium in the market that might arise due to weak and/or weak demand is partially accounted for 
in our regressions by controlling log per capita and its quadratic.    
21 The data on insurance premiums are sourced from Sigma database (See Swiss Re, 2010). The world median of 
average per capita total direct insurance premiums (life and nonlife) is USD 140.  Notably, the sample of countries 
with average insurance premiums greater than the median does not completely overlap with the cohort of 
developed countries used in Table 3. For instance, there are 61 developed countries of which 19 are with average 
insurance premiums less than its median. Besides, several developing countries including Chile, Jamaica, Malaysia 
and South Africa have average insurance premiums greater than the world median. 
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insurance premiums, but it is statistically very strong in countries with lower per capita insurance 
premium. Notably, in all these exercises, our shifter variables were estimated to be statistically 
significant. 
7. Conclusions 
Using the ground-motion amplitude derived from the Richter magnitude scale as a novel 
instrumental variable and covering almost all independent countries in the world from 1950 to 
2007, our analysis indicates that earthquake shocks have two contradicting effects on democratic 
conditions. First, contrary to the conventional wisdom in the exogenous shocks literature (e.g., 
rainfall and natural disasters), where such incidents severely diminish the speed of economic 
development and social welfare, this paper shows that the effect of earthquakes on income is 
positive, which is consistent with the ‘creative destruction’ hypothesis’. Further, this outcome 
increases the opportunity cost of contesting the incumbent regime, which makes a more autocratic 
regime easier to attain or sustain (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Bruckner and Ciccone, 2011). 
Overall, this evidence points to the indirect (i.e., income) effect of earthquakes on political change. 
Our result additionally documents that, contrary to the literature which finds an ambiguous effect 
on democracy, there is a negative and significant indirect effect of income on democracy when the 
income shocks are driven by earthquakes. 
On the other hand, earthquakes may directly drive movements into democracy. We have 
interpreted this evidence as the reaction of voters to earthquake shocks where they release their 
wrath against the incumbent regime, holding them responsible for many human lives lost. The 
likelihood of such direct effect may spiral further through social networking (i.e., via informal 
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collective action), since earthquakes in general unite the victims. Our analysis provides strong and 
robust evidence for democracy-improving direct effect of earthquakes. 
  Together, the direct and indirect effects robustly suggest that the occurrence of one 
thousand deaths in every one million people in earthquakes improves democratic conditions by 
1.2 points in the Polity scale of [–10, 10]. In the sample of developing countries, the similar effects 
accelerate democratisation even more rapidly. While this evidence does not indicate a complete 
regime transition, it suggests that earthquake shocks have important direct effect on democracy as 
well as through the income channel in a significant set of countries. Further, the paper documents 
two intuitive mechanisms for each of the direct and indirect effects through which the said effects 
may arise, namely, technology transfer and financial stimulus mechanisms for the income channel, 
and election proximity and the extent of insured risk for the affective shock channel. Our results 
are robust to restrictive specifications and several sensitivity checks and falsification tests, which 
take into account the differential income levels, political regimes, different samples and earthquake 
intensities. In sum, the earthquake shocks open a new democratic window of opportunity, but this 
window is narrowed by improved economic conditions. Apart from the level of democracy, 
improvements in the efficiency of governments as providers of public services, decentralization of 
resources and responsibilities or changing the form of governments as outcomes of earthquake 
shocks may offer further extensions to this line of research.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Fig. 1. Death Toll and Total Affected Population due to Earthquakes from 1950 to 2007 
Note.: Intensity of death toll for each country is measured by �∑ Di,tNi=1
N
/ ∑ Pj,tnj=1
n
� × 100; where Di,t 
is the total number of deaths in earthquakes of country i at time t and N is total number of 
earthquakes occurred within the same time period, Pj,t is the total population of country j at time t 
and n is the number of years for which population data is available. Data definitions and sources 
are given in Appendix A1. Observations are initially averaged by country for each year, and then 
percentile distribution of the average number of death toll as well as total affected people due to 
earthquakes are calculated for each year from 1950 to 2009.  
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 Fig. 2. Linkage between Earthquake Death Toll, GDP per Capita and Polity2 Score 
Notes. The size of each dot is proportional to the intensity of death toll measured by 
∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
/ ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1
𝑡𝑡
 where Di,t is the total number of deaths in earthquakes of country i at time t and 
N is the total number of earthquakes occurred within the same time period, P is the total population 
and n is the number of years. Likewise, the GDP per capita and Polity2 score are measured as the 
average values of each country from 1950 to 2009. Polity2 score below 0 are autocratic; between 
0 to 7 partial democratic; and above 7 fully democratic countries (Epstein et al., 2006). The 
regression line yields a coefficient of 0.0004 (standard error = 0.00015). Data definitions and 
sources are provided in Appendix A1. Observations are averaged by country from 1950 to 2009; 
each of 162 dots represents a country. 
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 Fig. 3. Earthquake Hazard Map: The Ring of Fire Zone 
Source. Kious and Tilling (1996). 
Notes. The Ring of Fire zone is formed by the volcanic arcs and oceanic trenches encircling the 
Pacific Basin. The trenches are shown in black lines.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
    
Log Ground Motion in Earthquakes (in Millimeters), t 0.3168 1.5997 11303 
Death Toll in Thousand Population, t 0.0058 0.1628 10951 
Total Affected in Thousand Population, t 0.7413 20.4938 10951 
Log Real GDP per capita, t 8.4621 1.1288 8368 
Log Neighbours’ Average GDP, t 25.6536 1.7695 8476 
Polity2, t 0.0726 7.5125 7608 
Neighbours’ Average Polity2, t 0.9289 6.7809 8266 
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Table 2 
Earthquake Death Toll, Income, and Democracy 
Model 2.1: Effects of Death Toll 2.2: Effects of Affected Population 
  
Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Total 
Affected per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log Ground Motion  0.018   2.588   
in Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.002)***   (0.208)***   
       
Log Real GDP  2.951  –1.567 319.1  –1.272 
per Capita, t (1.693)*  (0.263)*** (218.8)  (0.262)*** 
       
Squared Log Real GDP  –0.136   –14.67   
per Capita, t (0.100)   (12.93)   
       
Death Toll per  0.374 1.782    
Thousand Population , t  (0.055)*** (0.996)*    
       
Total Affected per     0.002 0.012 
Thousand Population , t     (0.0004)*** (0.008) 
       
Log Neighbours’   –0.023   –0.022  
Average GDP, t  (0.012)*   (0.012)*  
       
Neighbours’   0.130   0.130 
Average Polity2, t   (0.016)***   (0.016)*** 
       
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 6,257 6,257 6,257 6,257 6,257 6,257 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
*Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3 
Earthquake Death Toll, Income, and Democracy:  
Developing Versus Developed Countries 
Model 3.1: Developing Countries 3.2: Developed Countries 3.3: Per capita GDP> US$4000 
  
Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Log Ground Motion 0.02   0.0008   0.026   
in Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.002)***  (0.0001)***   (0.003)***  
          
Log Real GDP  –1.078  –2.624 0.043  0.233 –14.43  –0.044 
Per Capita, t (2.790)  (0.345)*** (0.084)  (0.289) (17.54)  (0.375) 
          
Squared Log Real GDP  0.117   –0.002   0.766   
Per Capita, t (0.175)   (0.005)   (0.921)   
          
Death Toll per  0.369 2.325  0.729 25.521  0.068 2.760 
Thousand Population , t  (0.050)*** (0.983)**  (3.422) (41.024)  (0.042) (0.905)*** 
          
Log Neighbours’   0.025   –0.068   –0.043  
Average GDP, t  (0.016)   (0.017)***   (0.011)***  
          
Neighbours’   0.043   0.260   0.192 
Average Polity2, t   (0.019)**   (0.026)***   (0.018)*** 
          
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 4,537 4,537 4,537 1,720 1,720 1,720 3,302 3,302 3,302 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
Estimations by substituting ‘Total affected per thousand population’ for ‘Death toll per thousand population’ provide 
qualitatively similar results. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4 
The Trifurcation Effect of Earthquake Death Toll:  
Different Sub-Samples Based on Political Regime 
Model 4.1: Polity from –10 to 0 4.2: Polity from 1 to 7 4.3: Polity from 8 to 10 
  
Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, 
t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
Capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, 
t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
Capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, 
t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
Capita, t 
Polity2, 
t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Log Ground Motion 0.052   0.014   0.002   
 in Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.004)***  (0.002)***  (0.0003)***  
          
Log Real GDP  1.404  –1.217 –0.767  –1.824 –0.012  0.518 
Per Capita, t (2.089)  (0.231)*** (3.243)  (0.835)** (0.978)  (0.318) 
          
Squared Log Real GDP  –0.063   0.086   –0.004   
Per Capita, t (0.121)   (0.204)   –0.053   
          
Death Toll per  0.079 0.606  0.268 4.646  –0.840 5.386 
Thousand Population , t  (0.039)** (0.475)  (0.088)*** (2.253)**  (0.378)** (5.321) 
          
Log Neighbours’   –0.055   0.160   –0.033  
Average GDP, t  (0.022)**   (0.025)***   (0.009)*** 
          
Neighbours’   0.082   –0.047   –0.0004 
Average Polity2, t   (0.0170)***   (0.032)   (0.012) 
          
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 2,906 2,906 2,906 1,107 1,107 1,107 2,104 2,104 2,104 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
*Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 5 
Earthquake Death Toll, Income, and Democracy: 
Considering Ring of Fire Countries, Major Earthquakes and Frequency of Earthquakes 
Model 5.1: Sample Excluding Ring of 
Fire Countries 
5.2: Sample Excluding Major 
Earthquakes  
 
5.3: Model Including 
Frequency of Earthquakes 
  
Death Toll per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll 
per Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Log Ground Movement  0.0164   0.017   0.022   
in Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.00157)***   (0.002)***   (0.002)***   
          
Number of 5+ Richter-       –0.025  0.346 
scale Earthquakes, t        (0.010)**  (0.135)** 
          
Log Real GDP  0.609  –1.830 2.666  –1.654 2.901  –0.155 
per capita, t (1.321)  (0.276)*** (1.665)  (0.263)*** (1.704)*  (0.261) 
          
Squared Log Real GDP  –0.0141   –0.120   –0.134   
Per Capita, t (0.0782)   (0.098)   (0.101)   
          
Death Toll in   0.420 3.225  0.382 1.964  0.361 –0.973 
Thousand Population, t  (0.0856)*** (1.598)**  (0.058)*** (1.051)*  (0.054)*** (1.203) 
          
Log Neighbours' Average   –0.0120   –0.021   –0.023  
GDP, t  (0.0124)   (0.012)*   (0.012)*  
          
Neighbours' Average    0.164   0.130   0.131 
Polity2, t   (0.0172)***   
(0.016)**
*   
(0.016)*** 
          
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 5,327 5,327 5,327 6,247 6,247 6,247 6,257 6,257 6,257 
Notes. ‘Ring of Fire’ countries, where around 90% of the world’s earthquakes occur, include: Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines and the United States. Three-stage 
least squares estimation.  In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; 
***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 6 
The Creative Destruction Effect of Earthquakes: Technology Transfer Mechanism 
Model 61: All Countries with Available 
Patents Data 
6.2: Countries Below Median Number 
of Patents 
6.3: Countries Above Median Number of 
Patents 
  
Death Toll 
per Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll 
per Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Log Ground Movement  0.008   0.012   0.004   
in Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.002)***   (0.003)***   (0.001)***   
          
Log Real GDP  0.515  -2.372 1.528  -2.532 0.541  -2.513 
per capita, t (2.823)  (0.579)*** (5.924)  (0.862)*** (1.765)  (0.798)*** 
          
Squared Log Real GDP  0.024   -0.013   -0.048   
Per Capita, t (0.160)   (0.346)   (0.097)   
          
Death Toll in   0.433 3.443  0.367 5.042  -1.065 6.758 
Thousand Population, t  (0.084)*** (2.025)*  (0.081)*** (1.925)***  (0.197)*** (4.937) 
          
Log Neighbours' Average   0.011   -0.012   0.007  
GDP, t  (0.014)   (0.029)   (0.013)  
          
Neighbours' Average    0.230   0.043   0.266 
Polity2, t   (0.027)***   (0.040)   (0.035)*** 
          
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 2,824 2,824 2,824 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,454 1,454 1,454 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. The median of total number of patent 
applications in our dataset is 1226. Notably, the sample of countries with more than the median of number of patents does not completely match with the cohort 
of developed countries used in Table 3. For instance, in 2005, out of 39 countries with more than the median of number of countries, 21 countries exclude from 
the cohort of developed countries. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 7 
The Creative Destruction Effect of Earthquakes: Investment Stimulus Mechanism 
Model 7.1: Full Sample 7.2: Sample with Countries Below 
Median Investment Share 
7.3: Sample with Countries Above 
Median Investment Share 
 
Death Toll in 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
polity 2, t Death Toll in 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
polity 2, t Death Toll in 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
polity 2, t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Log Ground Movement in  0.018   0.009   0.022   
Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.002)***   -0.054   (0.002)***   
          
Log Real GDP per 
capita, t 3.125  -1.570 -106.7  -0.720 2.325  -2.361 
 (1.748)*  (0.266)*** (444.1)  (0.370)* (2.659)  (0.405)*** 
          
Squared Log Real GDP  -0.146   6.359   -0.09   
Per Capita, t (0.103)   (26.99)   (0.149)   
          
Death Toll in   0.373 1.724  -0.016 -1.884  0.176 2.015 
Thousand Population, t  (0.055)*** (0.995)*  -0.082 (1.673)  (0.050)*** (1.015)** 
          
Log Neighbours'   -0.0250   -0.034   -0.016  
Average GDP, t  (0.012)**   (0.019)*   -0.012  
          
Neighbours' Average    0.127   0.087   0.063 
Polity2, t   (0.016)***   (0.023)***   (0.020)*** 
          
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 6,047 6,047 6,047 3,155 3,155 3,155 2,892 2,892 2,892 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. The median investment share in GDP per 
capita in our dataset is 19.61. Notably, the sample of countries with more than the median of investment share does not completely match with the cohort of developed 
countries used in Table 3. For instance, in 2005, out of 97 countries of which the investment share is more than its median, 53 countries exclude from the cohort of 
developed countries. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 8 
The Affective Effect of Earthquakes: Election Proximity Mechanism 
Model Model 8.1 Model 8.2 
  
Death Toll in 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
polity2, t Death Toll 
in Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
polity2, t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log Ground Movement in  0.0187   0.019   
 Earthquakes (in millimeters), t (0.002)***   (0.002)***   
Log Real GDP per capita, t 3.013  -1.613 3.497  -1.394 
 (1.734)*  (0.269)*** (1.697)**  (0.268)*** 
Squared Log Real  -0.140   -0.169   
 GDP Per Capita, t (0.102)   (0.100)*   
Log Neighbours' Average GDP, t  -0.027   -0.029  
  (0.012)**   (0.01)**  
Neighbours' Average Polity2, t   0.141   0.139 
   (0.016)***   (0.016)*** 
       
Death Toll in Thousand   0.346 1.853  0.345 1.570 
 Population, t  (0.054)*** (0.982)*  (0.050)*** (0.980) 
Death Toll in Thousand       -0.336 
Population, t-1      (0.177)* 
Death Toll in Thousand       -0.373 
 Population, t-2      (0.180)** 
Death Toll in Thousand       -0.324 
 Population, t-3      (0.252) 
Election year dummy, t-1      0.635 
      (0.105)*** 
Death Toll in Thousand Population,       5.303 
t-1 * Election year dummy, t-1      (3.060)* 
Death Toll in Thousand Population,       0.220 
 t-2 * Election year dummy, t-1      (0.817) 
Death Toll in Thousand Population,       -0.195 
t-3 * Election year dummy, t-1      (0.347) 
       
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 5,922 5,922 5,922 5,922 5,922 5,922 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. We 
construct Election year dummy by assigning 1 if any form of national elections—including presidential, legislative, 
parliamentary, and constituent assembly— takes place in a given year, 0 otherwise (Hyde and Marinov 2012).*Significant at 
10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 9 
The Affective Effect of Earthquakes: Insurance Premium Mechanism 
Model Model 9.1: Sample with Countries 
Above the  Median Insurance 
Premium 
Model 9.2: Sample with Countries 
Below the Median Insurance Premium 
 
Death Toll in 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll in 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log Ground Movement in  0.007   0.014   
Earthquakes (in millimeters), t (0.001)***   (0.003)***   
       
Log Real  0.957  1.556 4.644  -6.069 
GDP per capita, t (0.691)  (0.434)*** (4.463)  (0.638)*** 
       
Squared Log Real  -0.044   -0.199   
GDP Per Capita, t (0.035)   (0.259)   
       
Death Toll in   0.865 4.039  0.394 3.784 
Thousand Population, t  (0.245)*** (4.502)  (0.062)*** (1.350)*** 
       
Log Neighbours'   -0.078   0.077  
Average GDP, t  (0.013)***   (0.024)***  
       
Neighbours'    0.201   -0.019 
Average Polity2, t   (0.025)***   (0.031) 
       
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,801 1,801 1,801 2,007 2,007 2,007 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
The data on insurance premiums are sourced from Swiss Re, Sigma (See Appendix A1). The median of average per capita 
total direct insurance premiums (life and nonlife) in USD is 140. Notably, the sample of countries with average insurance 
premiums greater than the median does not completely match with the cohort of developed countries used in Table 3. For 
instance, there are 61 developed countries of which 19 are with average insurance premiums less than its median. 
*Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.  
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Appendix A1. Data and Sources 
   
Variable Description Source 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ Death toll per thousand people in earthquakes: the total 
number of deaths due to all earthquakes occurred in a 
given year in each country 
EM-DAT dataset 
available at 
http://www.emdat.be/ 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 Total affected per thousand people in earthquakes: the 
sum of total injured, homeless and affected people due to 
all earthquakes occurred in a given year in each country 
EM-DAT dataset 
 
Intl_aid Disaster-specific international aid contributions: we 
converted this variable into 2005 US dollars using 
the United States’ Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 
comparability purposes. 
EM-DAT dataset 
available at 
http://www.emdat.be/ 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 Ground motion in earthquakes (in millimetres): 
constructed using Richter scale measure of earthquake 
events from 1950 to 2007, according to procedures 
described in the paper 
Calculated from earthquake 
Richter scale data 
available at 
http://www.emdat.be/ 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦 Number of 5+ earthquakes in Richter scale in a given 
year for each country 
http://www.emdat.be/ 
Insurance Average per capita total direct insurance premium (life 
and nonlife) in USD 
Sigma database (Swiss Re, 
2010) 
http://www.swissre.com/sig
ma/ 
𝑦𝑦 Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series) http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 Average GDP of neighbouring countries: constructed 
using real GDP per capita dataset from PWT 
Calculated from Penn 
World Tables (PWT) 
ki Investment Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 
2005 constant prices (%) 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
Patents Number of patent applications: filed through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent 
office for exclusive rights for an invention. 
http://data.worldbank.org/d
ata-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦2 Polity measure of democracy: the revised combined 
Polity score; the maximum range of this measure is from 
Polity IV database 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 
2005) 
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–10 to 10; positive (negative) values indicate an 
improvement (deterioration) in democracy 
𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 Average Polity2 score of neighboring countries: 
constructed using Polity measure of democracy 
Calculated from Polity IV 
database 
 
Election Year Dummy variable if any election—including presidential, 
legislative, parliamentary, and constituent assembly— 
takes place in a given year. 
Legislative/Parliamentary, Executive, Constituent 
Assembly 
National Elections Across 
Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA) 
Dataset (Hyde and 
Marinov 2012) 
Available at 
http://hyde.research.yale.ed
u/nelda 
𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 Total population in thousands http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
Developed vs. 
Developing 
Country 
Classification  
As classified in World Development Indicators (WDI, 
2012).  
 
http://data.worldbank.org/d
ata-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
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NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 
Appendix A2. Countries and Their Codes Included in the Sample 
Country Code Country Code Country Code 
Afghanistan AFG Cyprus CYP Italy ITA 
Albania ALB Czech Rep CZE Ivory Coast IVO 
Algeria DZA Denmark DNK Jamaica JAM 
Angola AGO Djibouti DJI Japan JPN 
Argentina ARG Dominican Rep DOM Jordan JOR 
Armenia ARM Ecuador ECU Kazakhstan KAZ 
Australia AUS Egypt EGY Kenya KEN 
Austria AUT El Salvador SLV Korea Rep KOR 
Azerbaijan AZE Equatorial Guinea GNQ Kuwait KWT 
Bahrain BHR Eritrea ERI Kyrgyzstan KGZ 
Bangladesh BGD Estonia EST Lao P Dem Rep LAO 
Belarus BLR Ethiopia ETH Latvia LVA 
Belgium BEL Fiji FJI Lebanon LBN 
Benin BEN Finland FIN Lesotho LSO 
Bhutan BTN France FRA Liberia LBR 
Bolivia BOL Gabon GAB Libyan Arab Jamah LBY 
Bosnia-Herzegovinian BIH Gambia The GMB Lithuania LTU 
Botswana BWA Georgia GEO Macedonia FRY MKD 
Brazil BRA Germany GER Madagascar MDG 
Bulgaria BGR Germany Fed Rep DFR Malawi MWI 
Burkina Faso BFA Ghana GHA Malaysia MYS 
Burundi BDI Greece GRC Mali MLI 
Cambodia KHM Guatemala GTM Mauritania MRT 
Cameroon CMR Guinea GIN Mauritius MUS 
Canada CAN Guinea Bissau GNB Mexico MEX 
Central African Rep CAF Guyana GUY Moldova Rep MDA 
Chad TCD Haiti HTI Mongolia MNG 
Chile CHL Honduras HND Montenegro MNE 
China P Rep CHN Hungary HUN Morocco MAR 
Colombia COL India IND Mozambique MOZ 
Comoros COM Indonesia IDN Namibia NAM 
Congo COG Iran Islam Rep IRN Nepal NPL 
Costa Rica CRI Iraq IRQ Netherlands NLD 
Croatia HRV Ireland IRL New Zealand NZL 
Cuba CUB Israel ISR Nicaragua NIC 
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Niger NER Singapore SGP Tunisia TUN 
Nigeria NGA Slovakia SVK Turkey TUR 
Norway NOR Slovenia SVN Turkmenistan TKM 
Oman OMN Solomon Is SLB Uganda UGA 
Pakistan PAK Somalia SOM Ukraine UKR 
Panama PAN South Africa ZAF United Arab Emirates ARE 
Papua New Guinea PNG Spain ESP United Kingdom GBR 
Paraguay PRY Sri Lanka LKA United States USA 
Peru PER Sudan SDN Uruguay URY 
Philippines PHL Swaziland SWZ Uzbekistan UZB 
Poland POL Sweden SWE Venezuela VEN 
Portugal PRT Switzerland CHE Viet Nam VNM 
Qatar QAT Syrian Arab Rep SYR Yemen YEM 
Romania ROM Taiwan (China) TWN Yemen Arab Rep YMN 
Russia RUS Tajikistan TJK Zaire/Congo Dem Rep COD 
Rwanda RWA Tanzania United Rep TZA Zambia ZMB 
Saudi Arabia SAU Thailand THA Zimbabwe ZWE 
Senegal SEN Togo TGO   
Sierra Leone SLE Trinidad and Tobago TTO   
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Appendix A3. Checking the Exclusion Restrictions of Neighbor-Weighted IVs Using Trade-
Weighted Variables 
Model A3.1: Direct Effects of Neighbours’ Polity2 on per capita GDP 
A3.2: Direct Effects of Neighbours’ GDP 
on Polity2 
A3.3: Direct Effects of Neighbours’ Polity2 
on per capita GDP plus Direct Effects of 
Neighbours’ GDP on Polity2  
  
Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll 
per Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t Death Toll 
per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
Polity2, t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log Ground Motion 0.020   0.020   0.020   
in Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.002)***   (0.002)***   (0.002)***   
          
Log Real GDP  2.573  -1.995 2.180  -1.964 1.175  -2.049 
Per Capita, t (1.432)*  (0.282)*** (1.505)  (0.283)*** (1.320)  (0.282)*** 
          
Squared Log Real GDP  -0.115   -0.091   -0.066   
Per Capita, t (0.084)   (0.089)   (0.076)   
          
Death Toll per  0.330 2.457  0.330 2.469  0.330 2.559 
Thousand Population , t  (0.054)*** (1.000)**  (0.054)*** (1.005)**  (0.054)*** (1.002)** 
          
Log Neighbours’   -0.030   -0.029 0.022  -0.028  
Average GDP, t  (0.013)**   (0.012)** (0.240)  (0.012)**  
          
Neighbours’  -0.000 0.135   0.142   0.135 
Average Polity2, t  (0.001) (0.017)***   (0.017)***   (0.017)*** 
          
Trade-weighted    -2.650      -2.664 
Polity2 Score, t-1   (0.540)***      (0.540)*** 
          
Trade-weighted      -0.007   -0.007  
Log GDP, t-1     (0.009)   (0.009)  
          
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 5,476 5,476 5,476 5,476 5,476 5,476 5,476 5,476 5,476 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
*Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Appendix A4. Trifurcation Effects of Total Affected Population in Earthquakes: 
Robustness Sub-Samples Based on Political Regime 
Model A4.1: Polity from –10 to 0 A4.2: Polity from 1 to 7 A4.3: Polity from 8 to 10 
  
Total 
Affected per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
Capita, t 
Polity2, t Total 
Affected per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
Capita, t 
Polity2, 
t 
Total 
Affected per 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
Capita, t 
Polity2, 
t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log Ground Motion    4.809    5.830   0.255   
 in Earthquakes (in mm), t  (0.456)***     (0.526)***   (0.0397)***  
          
Log Real GDP  157.4  –1.283 3.195  –0.113 –238.8  –0.477 
Per Capita, t (249.5)  (0.231)*** (707.8)  (0.820) (135.0)*  (0.319) 
          
Squared Log Real GDP  –6.608   5.165   14.190   
Per Capita, t (14.49)   (44.58)   (7.367)*   
          
Total Affected per  0.0008 0.007  0.001 0.010  0.016 0.040 
Thousand Population , t  (0.0004)** (0.005)  (0.0002)*** (0.006)*  (0.003)*** (0.035) 
          
Log Neighbours’   –0.054   0.180   –0.035  
Average GDP, t  (0.022)**     (0.024)***  (0.011)*** 
          
Neighbours’   0.082   –0.050   0.001 
Average Polity2, t   (0.017)***  (0.032)   (0.012) 
          
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,906 2,906 2,906 1,107 1,107 1,107 2,104 2,104 2,104 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
*Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Appendix A5: The Creative Destruction Effect of Earthquakes through Technology 
Transfer: 2SLS Results 
Model A5.1: Countries with 
data on patents 
A5.2: Countries 
with patents lower 
than the median 
A5.3: Countries 
with patents more 
than the median 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Log Real GDP per capita, t 
    
Death Toll in Thousand Population, t 0.482 0.369 -0.988 
 (0.259)* (0.236) (0.507)* 
    
Panel B: First Stage for Death Toll per Thousand Population, t 
    
Log Ground Movement in  0.013 0.022 0.006 
Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.007)* (0.014) (0.003)** 
    
Log Real GDP per capita, t 0.052 -0.328 -0.016 
 (0.218) (0.277) (0.118) 
    
Squared Log Real GDP  -0.001 0.023 -0.001 
Per Capita, t (0.011) (0.019) (0.006) 
    
Observations 3,089 1,544 1,543 
Notes. The objective of this analysis is to confirm the system estimation results of Table 6 using a single estimation 
technique. The median total number of patent applications in our dataset is 1226. The robust standard errors clustered 
at the country level are in parentheses. First-stage regressions in Panel B are estimated with OLS. In Panel A, Columns 
(1−3) are estimated with 2SLS. In Panel A of Column 2, the coefficient is significant at 12% level. *Significant at 
10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Appendix A6: The Creative Destruction Effect of Earthquakes through Investment 
Stimulus: 2SLS Results 
Model A6.1: Countries 
with data on 
investment share 
A6.2: Countries 
with less than the 
median investment 
share 
A6.3: Countries with 
more than the 
median investment 
share 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Log of Real GDP Per Capita, t 
    
Death Toll in Thousand Population, t 0.264 -0.133 0.171 
 (0.124)** (0.0989) (0.101)* 
    
Panel B: First stage for Death Toll in Thousand Population, t 
    
Log Ground Movement in  0.0226 0.0219 0.0236 
Earthquakes (in mm), t (0.00792)*** (0.0135) (0.0106)** 
    
Log Real GDP per capita, t -0.0479 -0.0234 0.0488 
 (0.0354) (0.0323) (0.141) 
    
Squared Log Real GDP Per Capita, t 0.00386 0.00119 -0.00149 
 (0.00218)* (0.00179) (0.00710) 
    
Observations 7,750 3,876 3,874 
Notes. The objective of this analysis is to confirm the system estimation results of Table 7 using a single 
estimation technique. The median investment share of real GDP per capita in our dataset is 19.61. In 
parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. First-stage regressions in Panel B are 
estimated with OLS. In Panel A, Columns (1−3) are estimated with 2SLS. The coefficient of Log ground 
movement in earthquakes in Column 2 is significant at 11% level. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 
5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Appendix A7: Earthquakes, Disaster-Specific International Aid, and Income 
Model Model A7.1 Model A7.2 
 
Death Toll in 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
polity 2, t Death Toll in 
Thousand 
Population, t 
Log Real 
GDP per 
capita, t 
polity 2, t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log Ground Movement in  0.028   0.027   
Earthquakes (in millimeters), t (0.002)***   (0.002)***   
       
Log Real GDP per capita, t 3.734  -1.178 3.094  -1.290 
 (3.640)  (0.338)*** (3.622)  (0.339)*** 
       
Squared Log Real GDP Per Capita, t -0.191   -0.155   
 (0.215)   (0.213)   
       
Death Toll in Thousand Population, t  0.142 0.892  0.143 1.209 
  (0.041)*** (0.899)  (0.041)*** (0.892) 
       
Log Neighbours' Average GDP, t  -0.038   -0.038  
  (0.013)***   (0.013)***  
       
Neighbours' Average Polity2, t   0.156   0.156 
   (0.018)***   (0.018)*** 
       
Log Disaster-specific International Aid, t     -0.0001  
     (0.003)  
       
Observations 4,625 4,625 4,625 4,625 4,625 4,625 
Notes. Three-stage least squares estimation. In parentheses are the robust standard errors clustered at the country level. We converted 
the data on disaster-specific international aid into 2005 US dollars using the United States’ Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 
comparability purposes *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.  
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Appendix B1. An Illustrative Case Study of Investment Stimulus Following an Earthquake 
 
In May 2008, an earthquake hit the Sichuan province in China claiming at least 80,000 
human lives and shattering many years’ accumulated capital stock. In a massive recovery and 
reconstruction effort following the disaster, China’s National Development and Reform 
Commission—the administrative body that steers the Chinese economy—adopted a recovery plan 
that included building 169 hospitals, and 4,432 primary and secondary schools to replace the 
collapsed structures in affected areas (Watts, 2008). In addition, Watts (2008) report that around 
2,600 schools that survived the earthquake would be retrofitted. The recovery program also 
comprised new houses for approximately three million rural households whose homes were 
destroyed during the earthquake and 860,000 apartments for urban dwellers. Moreover, a 150 km. 
urban highway connecting Chengdu (i.e., the provincial capital) and Mianyang was built. Various 
welfare programs were also initiated to support the 1.4 million extreme poor affected by the disaster 
(Watts, 2008). The State Information Centre— a Chinese government research body—estimated 
that such a massive post-earthquake rebuilding effort would cost $150 billion and was adequate to 
increase the national annual economic growth by 0.3 per cent. UNESCAP (2013) documented that 
the income level in Sichuan province has doubled during post-earthquake period—ranking the 
Sichuan economy the first among all provinces in Western China, which accommodated 200 of the 
Fortune 500 firms. Overall, the massive post-earthquake recovery plan spurred an instantaneous 
boost to the economy by replacing obsolete economic infrastructure with more productive capital 
stock. 
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